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MILITARY COMMISSIONS, CRIMINAL 
COURT, AND THE CHRISTMAS  
DAY BOMBER 
Ian Kennedy* 
Abstract: On December 25, 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted 
to detonate an explosive device on a plane landing in Detroit. The attack 
was unsuccessful, but it spurred an important domestic debate regarding 
U.S. anti-terrorist programs and policies. In particular, the event fueled an 
argument over the proper forum for the interrogation and prosecution of 
terrorist suspects captured in the United States. Focusing on national se-
curity issues, some contended that treating Abdulmutallab as a criminal 
defendant in an Article III court, rather than subjecting him to a military 
commission, was imprudent and dangerous, while others insisted that it 
was entirely appropriate and responsible. This Note will probe this debate 
by comparing the two tribunals as each relates to the legal protections for 
suspects during interrogation. The Note argues that although some differ-
ences do exist, it is quite plausible that treating Abdulmutallab and other 
captured terrorist suspects as criminal defendants in Article III courts does 
not adversely impact intelligence gathering and national security. 
Introduction 
 At approximately noon on Christmas Day in 2009, federal officials 
were notified about a passenger on Northwest Flight 253 who had at-
tempted to detonate an explosive device while on board the aircraft.1 
Just prior to landing in Detroit, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-
called “Christmas Day Bomber,” lit a device concealed in his clothing, 
igniting a fire on the plane.2 The device failed to fully explode, and 
passengers and crew restrained the Nigerian national until officials 
could board the plane and take him into custody.3 
 
* Ian Kennedy is an Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Comparative 
Law Review. The author would like to pay tribute to his father, the late Christopher Ken-
nedy, for his many years of support and sacrifice. 
1 Devlin Barrett, Rights of Plane Bomb Suspect at Issue, Newsday, Jan. 25, 2010, at A20. 
2 Indictment at 2, 3, United States v. Abdulmutallab, No. 2:10-cr-20005 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 
6, 2010). 
3 Barrett, supra note 1. 
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 The event understandably touched a nerve in the American pub-
lic, as some observed that the series of intelligence failures which cul-
minated in allowing Abdulmutallab to board the plane were frighten-
ingly similar to the failures that led to 9/11.4 In addition to the 
intelligence failures, there was also a firestorm of political controversy 
over the treatment of Abdulmutallab in the time immediately after the 
failed terrorist attack.5 The argument generally divided along party 
lines, with Republicans contending that it was a mistake to bring crimi-
nal charges in an Article III court against Abdulmutallab rather than 
holding him as an unprivileged enemy belligerent before a military 
commission; Democrats, meanwhile, argued that criminal charges in 
civilian court were appropriate and customary.6 
 This Note analyzes the primary premise underlying the Republi-
can criticism; namely, that putting Abdulmutallab in an Article III court 
grants him rights during interrogation that undermine American na-
tional security. This Note concludes that, indeed, there are some differ-
ences between the two tribunals in terms of the right to counsel and 
rights during interrogation, but the differences are not as significant as 
Republicans suggest. In fact, in the case of Abdulmutallab, it is quite 
possible that putting him in an Article III court does not adversely im-
pact intelligence gathering at all. 
 Part I of this Note provides information about the events sur-
rounding the interrogation of Abdulmutallab and an explanation of 
the Republican criticism of the process. It also provides a brief history 
of and the current state of military commissions. Part II evaluates fea-
tures of both Article III criminal courts and military commissions. In 
particular, it analyzes a suspect’s right to counsel and limitations on in-
terrogation as conferred by domestic and international law. Finally, 
Part III of this Note compares the differences between the two tribunals 
and concludes that the differences are quite likely irrelevant to intelli-
gence gathering in the case of Abdulmutallab and other similar situa-
tions where terrorists are captured in the United States. 
                                                                                                                      
4 See, e.g., Thomas H. Kean & John Farmer Jr., Op-Ed., How 12/25 Was Like 9/11, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 6, 2010, at A23. 
5 See Evan Perez, Christmas Day Bomber: Criminal or Enemy Combatant?, Wall St. J. (Jan. 
5, 2010, 17:20 EST), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/01/05/christmas-day-bomber-
criminal-or-enemy-combatant/tab/article/. 
6 See id.; Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mitch 
McConnell, Senator, U.S. Senate (Feb. 3, 2010), at 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
cjs/docs/ag-letter-2–3–10.pdf. 
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I. Background 
A. Miranda and Political Controversy 
1. Miranda Warnings 
 Federal and local authorities apprehended Abdulmutallab when 
the plane landed.7 While in their custody, he made incriminating state-
ments regarding his efforts to bomb the plane.8 Following initial treat-
ment for his injuries, FBI and other federal agents questioned the ter-
rorist suspect for fifty minutes without administering Miranda warnings, 
relying on an exception which allows custodial interrogation before 
Miranda warnings in cases where it is reasonable to believe that there is a 
threat to public safety.9 After the fifty minutes, investigators took a five-
hour break from questioning because Abdulmutallab’s “deteriorating” 
medical condition required surgery.10 Later, when a second team of 
agents started to question him, approximately ten hours after being ar-
rested, he refused to speak and investigators subsequently read him his 
Miranda rights.11 In the month that followed, after federal agents in-
dicted Abdulmutallab in Article III criminal court and brought his fam-
ily to the United States, reports indicate that he changed course and 
substantially cooperated with investigators at the urging of his relatives.12 
2. Political Controversy 
 In the aftermath of the failed attack, Republican politicians and 
others forcefully questioned the prudence of trying Abdulmutallab and 
terrorists like him in a civilian court.13 Sarah Palin led the charge from 
                                                                                                                      
 
7 Barrett, supra note 1. 
8 Id. 
9 Walter Pincus, Christmas Day Bomb Suspect Was Read Miranda Rights Nine Hours After 
Arrest, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 2010, at A6. Miranda warnings were first established in the 
seminal case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Briefly stated, Miranda requires 
that during custodial interrogation and before any questioning occurs, law enforcement 
must notify the suspect of his right to remain silent, right to an attorney, and inform him 
that any statements made could be used in his prosecution. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
10 Pincus, supra note 9. 
11 Id. Initial reports suggested that he stopped speaking after the Miranda warnings, 
but a subsequent account indicated he received Miranda warnings only after refusing to 
speak. See Barrett, supra note 1; Pincus, supra note 9. 
12 Jeff Zeleny & Charlie Savage, Official Says Terrorism Suspect Is Cooperating, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 3, 2010, at A11. 
13See, e.g., Press Release, Lindsey Graham, Sen., U.S. Senate, Graham on Christmas Day 
Bomber Interrogation (Feb. 3, 2010), http://lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?Fuse 
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her Facebook account, proclaiming that “it simply makes no sense to 
treat an al-Qaeda trained operative willing to die in the course of mas-
sacring hundreds of people as a common criminal.”14 
 Although the criticism has not always been focused, the main tenet 
of the Republican argument is that interrogating the accused as a 
criminal defendant and providing a defense attorney impedes intelli-
gence gathering and threatens national security.15 As an alternative, 
Republicans advocate for the use of military commissions, which were 
constituted to provide hearings for a number of the Guantánamo Bay 
detainees as a way for them to challenge their detainment.16 In a letter 
to the Attorney General, high-ranking Senate Republicans blamed the 
administration for misguidedly treating Abdulmutallab as a criminal 
defendant, “rather than . . . an intelligence resource to be thoroughly 
interrogated in order to obtain potentially life-saving information.”17 
The letter charged that the administration sacrificed valuable opportu-
nities because of a “preoccupation with reading the Christmas Day 
bomber his Miranda rights.”18 Senator Lindsey Graham separately lev-
eled a slightly different criticism, focusing on the legal counsel argu-
                                                                                                                      
Action=PressRoom.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=94b692e5–802a-23ad-4641–1a34b485c 
7dd. 
14 Perez, supra note 5. 
15 See Graham, supra note 13; Press Release, Kit Bond, Sen., U.S. Senate, Bond Takes 
Aim at Administration’s Dangerous Terror Policies (Feb. 2, 2010) (on file with author); 
Press Release, Orrin Hatch, Sen., U.S. Senate, Hatch, GOP Senators to Attorney General 
Holder: Christmas Bomber Is Not a Civilian ( Jan. 21, 2010), http://hatch.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=531c20c6–1b78-be3e- 
e08e-c8170a55c91f&Month=1&Year=2010. 
16 See Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Experts Urge Keeping Two Options for Terror Trials, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 2010, at A15; Hatch, supra note 15. In addressing the closure of 
Guantánamo Bay, President Obama highlighted another possible category for some of the 
alleged terrorists held at Guantánamo: continued detention without trial before a military 
commission. Press Release, Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President on Na-
tional Security (May 21, 2009) [hereinafter Presidential Remarks], available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5–21–09. 
Such detainees would receive “periodic review” under “an appropriate legal regime . . . 
[that is] consistent with our values and our Constitution.” Id. President Obama explained 
that for certain detainees a trial before a military commission would not be prudent be-
cause, while the government has proof that these individuals are dangerous due to their 
terrorist connections, it could not prove these specific charges in a military commission 
considering the deficiencies in the cases such as tainted evidence. See id. An analysis of this 
second system of review is beyond the scope of this Note, as Republicans have generally 
called for trying the suspect before military commissions. See Savage & Shane, supra. 
17 Letter from Mitch McConnell, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Eric Holder Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dept. of Justice ( Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://republican.senate.gov/public/index. 
cfm?FuseAction=Blogs.View&Blog_Id=2e202a47-d3a2–4135-a343–91cb3a8d720a. 
18 Id. 
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ment and asserting that there is a “reason why we have never given 
unlawful enemy combatants legal counsel at the time of capture . . . it 
was a mistake to read him Miranda rights after he was apprehended 
and to suggest otherwise is just political spin.”19 
 Attorney General Holder responded to these various criticisms with 
a pointed letter of his own, underscoring that after 9/11, without excep-
tion, the practice has been to criminally charge any suspected terrorist 
captured in the United States.20 The Attorney General further disputed 
the notion that valuable information could not be acquired while charg-
ing a terrorist criminally; he argued that “history shows that the federal 
justice system is an extremely effective tool for gathering intelligence.”21 
B. Establishing Military Commissions 
 Since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government has grappled with the 
question of the proper forum in which to hold terrorists accountable 
for their actions.22 Proposals of what should be done have ranged from 
trying such individuals in traditional criminal courts to fashioning a 
brand new international tribunal.23 Ultimately, the Bush administration 
favored creating a unique military tribunal now known as military 
commissions.24 
 The first iteration of these commissions was established by execu-
tive order.25 The order limited the jurisdiction of the commissions to 
non-citizen members or associates of Al-Qaeda and delegated the duty 
of promulgating rules and procedures to the Secretary of Defense.26 
Notably, the order explicitly rejected any form of judicial review in a 
domestic court or international tribunal for verdicts rendered by the 
commissions.27 
 The first military commission hearing commenced in 2004, ap-
proximately thirty months after President Bush’s order.28 That hearing 
and others did not go smoothly, and critics at home and abroad criti-
                                                                                                                      
19 Graham, supra note 13. 
20 See Holder, supra note 6, at 2. 
21 Id. at 4. 
22 See David J.R. Frakt, An Indelicate Balance: A Critical Comparison of the Rules and Proce-
dures for Military Commissions and Courts-Martial, 34 Am. J. Crim. L. 315, 317–18 (2007). 
23 Id. at 318. 
24 See id. 
25 David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of Turmoil Over the Guantánamo 
Military Commissions, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 131, 147, 148 (2008). 
26 See Exec. Order No. 222, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
27 Id. 
28 See Glazier, supra note 25, at 161. 
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cized the ostensibly ad hoc procedures that suggested the U.S. govern-
ment was not fully prepared to provide an adequate adjudicatory 
body.29 In fact, the United Kingdom successfully removed two of its 
own citizens from facing the commission, insisting that they must be 
given “fair trials.”30 
                                                                                                                     
 All of the military commissions were abruptly halted in 2006, when 
a 5–3 ruling by the Supreme Court invalidated the rules of the commis-
sion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, holding that their “structure and proce-
dures violate both the [Uniform Code of Military Justice] and the Ge-
neva Conventions.”31 
 The Bush Administration and Congress responded quickly in 
2006, passing the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which sought to 
adhere to the guidance of the Supreme Court in Hamdan, thus estab-
lishing a system consistent with international and U.S. legal standards.32 
The military commissions began to take the shape of the military’s 
court-martial system.33 The MCA implemented many changes to the 
military commissions; included among these changes are that the 
MCA: 1) created an appellate review board of military judges for rul-
ings made by the trial panel presiding over the commission; 2) permit-
ted further judicial review of these rulings by the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the United States; 
3) rendered secret evidence inadmissible, only allowing the adjudicator 
to consider evidence that the accused also could hear; and 4) assured 
the accused the right to be present at trial.34 
 Though distinct from the original commissions, the new commis-
sions established by the MCA would nonetheless fail under the judicial 
scrutiny of the Supreme Court in 2008.35 In Boumediene v. Bush, the 
Court struck down § 7 of the statute, which sought to strip 
Guantánamo Bay detainees of their habeas corpus rights, thus recog-
nizing that such detainees could challenge their ongoing detention 
with a proper hearing in an Article III court or a sufficiently similar fo-
rum.36 While the decision focused on detention and left the overall 
 
29 See id. 
30 Id. at 157. 
31 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006). 
32 See Frakt, supra note 22, at 318–19. 
33 See Glazier, supra note 25, at 176. 
34 See id. at 176–77. 
35 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008). 
36 See id. 
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system of military commissions intact, questions persisted as to its viabil-
ity and constitutionality.37 
ive.45 
                                                                                                                     
 In 2009, Barack Obama assumed the presidency, promising changes 
to military commissions.38 On January 22, 2009, he signed an executive 
order suspending all commissions,39 while underscoring that they had 
only led to three convictions in seven years of existence.40 He called for 
Congress to amend the MCA, and improve upon the tribunal’s faults.41 
Accordingly, Congress amended the Military Commissions Act (2009 
MCA), which, among other important changes, bans the use of evi-
dence obtained by “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” and re-
verses the burden of proof with regards to the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence so that the accused no longer has to prove such evidence is 
unreliable.42 The jurisdiction of the 2009 MCA extends to “unprivileged 
enemy belligerents.”43 Essentially, unprivileged belligerents encompass 
any person who is a member of al-Qaeda or an individual that engages 
or materially assists in hostilities against the United States.44 In observ-
ing these changes, at least some scholars noted that military commis-
sions evolved quite a bit since their first iteration and are substantially 
more fair and effect
 
37 See Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantánamo, Obstacles and Options, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
Colloquy 29, 31 (2008). 
38 See Presidential Remarks, supra note 16. 
39 Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 ( Jan. 22, 2009). 
40 Presidential Remarks, supra note 16. 
41 Id. 
42 Scott L. Silliman, Prosecuting Alleged Terrorists by Military Commission: A Prudent Option, 
42 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 289, 291 n.11 (2009). 
43 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a)(Supp. III 2009). 
44 Id. § 948a(7). The 2009 MCA also excludes “privileged enemy belligerents” from the 
category of “unprivileged enemy belligerents.” Id. §§ 948a(6), 948a(7), 948b(a). In order 
for a captured detainee to be considered a “privileged enemy belligerent” they must fall 
under one of the eight categories of protected individuals in Article IV of the Geneva Con-
ventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Id. § 948a(6). 
45 See, e.g., Silliman, supra note 42, at 291. 
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II. Discussion 
A. Right to Counsel 
1. Right to Counsel in Military Commissions 
 Some, perhaps even all, unprivileged belligerents being tried be-
fore a military commission enjoy a constitutional right to counsel.46 In 
2004, after the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Yaser Hamdi 
did not have a right to immediately meet with an attorney, the Supreme 
Court asserted that Hamdi, a U.S. citizen detainee captured on the bat-
tlefield of Afghanistan and held in the United States, “unquestionably 
has the right to access counsel” with respect to proceedings on remand.47 
 In addition, the 2009 MCA provides that unprivileged belligerents 
“shall be represented” by defense counsel.48 The statute allows the de-
tainee to select any military or civilian counsel for representation in the 
commission; however, the civilian counsel, among other requirements, 
must be a U.S. citizen and obtain permission to handle sensitive na-
tional security information.49 Moreover, if civilian counsel is selected, 
then military counsel, also known as Judge Advocates Generals ( JAG), 
must assist as part of the defense team.50 
 With the integral role that JAGs play in the defense of the accused, 
obvious questions arise about their independence because they are law-
yers employed by the military.51 Such questions are merely speculative, 
however, because JAGs have been zealous advocates and “stubborn rule 
of law defenders” in the war on terrorism, even to the point that pro-
                                                                                                                      
46 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004). The reach of due process rights 
and the right to counsel for unprivileged belligerents mandated by Hamdi is still an unset-
tled legal issue. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and 
War, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 693, 743 n.227 (2009). Particularly complicated in the case of Abdul-
mutallab is that he had not established significant ties to the United States before being 
apprehended within U.S. borders. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 
(1953) (noting that “once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes 
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders. 
Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
47 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 539. The Court avoided the question of whether Hamdi was im-
mediately entitled to see an attorney after he was detained, only confirming that he should 
continue to have access going forward. See id. 
48 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b) (Supp. III 2009). 
49 See id. 
50 Id. 
51 See David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantánamo, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1981, 1999 
(2008). 
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ponents of the unitary executive theory in the Bush Administration 
viewed JAGs’ penchant for independence as a major challenge to in-
creasing Department of Defense control of the military.52 
 As a practical matter, even though the Constitution and the statu-
tory rules affirm a detainee’s right to counsel, some advocates have 
complained about the significant logistical impediments to meeting 
with individuals located at Guantánamo Bay.53 Complaints include dif-
ficulty traveling to the island, two-week notice requirements before a 
meeting, and a limited number of scheduling slots due to a lack of fa-
cilities.54 The continued relevancy of these concerns is called into ques-
tion, however, by a recent review which found that in 2008, the deten-
tion facility hosted approximately 1800 attorney visits on behalf of 
approximately 200 detainees being held there.55 Moreover, in the case 
of future unprivileged belligerents who are not detained at 
Guantánamo Bay, the logistical concerns related to traveling will pre-
sumably not be as cumbersome, where the detention occurs off of the 
isolated island.56 
2. Right to Counsel for a Civilian Criminal 
 In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel.”57 The Supreme Court 
interprets this right to not only require access to counsel, but to bar the 
government from eliciting statements from the accused in the absence 
of an attorney once criminal proceedings commence.58 The right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment does not attach, however, until 
                                                                                                                      
52 Id. at 2000, 2001–02. 
53 E.g., David Frakt, The Difficulty of Defending Detainees, 48 Washburn L. J. 381, 393–94 
(2009). 
54 Id. 
55 See Presidential Remarks, supra note 16 (mentioning the approximate number of detainees 
in Guantánamo); Rev. of Dep’t Compliance with President’s Executive Order on Detainee Condi-
tions of Confinement, U.S. Department of Defense 66 (2010) [hereinafter Detainee Report], 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/REVIEW_OF_DEPARTMENT_COMPLIANCE_WITH_PRE 
SIDENTS_EXECUTIVE_ORDER_ON_DETAINEE_CONDITIONS_OF_CONFINEMENTa.pdf 
(stating that there were 1800 attorney-detainee visits in 2008). 
56 See Frakt, supra note 53, at 393–94 (describing some of the logistical difficulties of 
traveling to Guantánamo); Charlie Savage, Closing Guantánamo Fades as a Priority, N.Y. 
Times, June 26, 2010, at A13 (reporting that the Guantánamo prison is set to be closed but 
progress has stalled along with President Obama’s proposal for alternative detainment 
camp locations). 
57 U.S. Const. amend. VI. 
58 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). 
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the government initiates adversarial judicial proceedings, “whether by 
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment.”59 
 Even though there are no specific Sixth Amendment obligations, a 
defendant is still protected before adversarial judicial proceedings 
commence because the Fifth Amendment demands the government 
provide the accused certain protections known as Miranda warnings.60 
Generally, under Miranda, once a defendant is taken into custody and 
before any interrogation can take place, law enforcement must advise 
the individual of their right to remain silent and their right to retain 
counsel.61 If the accused asserts his right to counsel, all questioning 
must cease until an attorney is present.62 
 There are also significant exceptions to the Miranda doctrine.63 
Pertinent to this Note is the public safety exception, where the mandate 
for law enforcement to issue Miranda warnings before interrogation is 
suspended if there is a substantial threat to public safety.64 The public 
safety exception provides that law enforcement may temporarily elect 
not to administer the warnings if the “need for answers to questions in 
a situation posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need for the 
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 
self-incrimination.”65 In evaluating the exigency of each situation in 
which the exception is invoked, the judicial branch will defer to the 
decisions of the officials on the ground.66 
B. Interrogation Limits 
1. Limitations on Interrogations in Military Commissions 
 In 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that struck down the Bush Administration’s pro-
cedures for military commissions because, among other requirements, 
the commissions failed to comport with Article III of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (known as “Common Article III”).67 The majority seized 
                                                                                                                      
59 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). 
60 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439, 444 (1966). 
61 See id. at 444. 
62 Id. at 444–45. 
63 See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984). 
64 Id. at 657. 
65 Id. 
66 See id. at 659. 
67 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006). 
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on the language in Common Article III that affords combatants “all the 
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples,” and then reasoned that the MCA of 2006 did not meet that 
standard.68 
 The Hamdan ruling set the stage for President Obama’s executive 
order, issued soon after taking office in 2009, in which he pronounced 
Common Article III as a minimum standard for all interrogations of 
individuals in U.S. custody.69 The order further stipulated that interro-
gations would be consistent with the nation’s other international obli-
gations, such as the Convention Against Torture (CAT), as well as do-
mestic laws like the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA).70 President Obama 
specifically identified Army Field Manual 2–22.3 as the appropriate 
guide for interrogators in the field, as it was deemed to be in compli-
ance with all of the aforementioned legal obligations.71 
a. Common Article III Limitations 
 In relevant part, Article III of the 1949 Geneva Conventions re-
quires parties to refrain from “violence to life and person” including 
“torture” when dealing with detainees, and it prohibits “outrages upon 
personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.”72 
Early in his presidency, President Obama ordered a Department of De-
fense commission to undertake the question of the specific application 
of Common Article III to detainee treatment.73 As part of evaluating the 
treatment of individuals at Guantánamo, the specially-convened com-
mission elaborated on the more specific obligations that flowed from 
Common Article III’s broad principles.74 
 Specifically, the commission noted that in accordance with Com-
mon Article III, any form of sensory deprivation is prohibited.75 They 
further explained that the broad mandate prohibits humiliation includ-
ing rape, sexual assault, and subjecting detainees to “public curiosity”; 
moreover, it barred violence, threats of violence, or any physical force 
upon detainees except when in self-defense or other narrowly defined 
                                                                                                                      
68 See id. at 633–34 (quoting Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva]). 
69 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 ( Jan. 22, 2009). 
70 Id. 
71 See id. 
72 Geneva, supra note 68, art. 3. 
73 Detainee Report, supra note 55, at 4. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 29. 
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emergency situations.76 As a general rule, the commission announced 
that if all interrogators adhered to the instructions of Army Field Man-
ual 2–22.3, the methods used would be in concert with Common Arti-
cle III.77 
b. Army Field Manual 2–22.3 Limitations 
 Army Field Manual 2–22.3, written and published in 2006, estab-
lished a minimum standard for the treatment of any detainee in military 
custody and it identifies interrogation techniques consistent with inter-
national law.78 The Manual very deliberately lays out the many forms of 
permissible interrogation methods in extended detail,79 and its general 
overview of forbidden techniques tracks the language of Common Arti-
cle III by prohibiting “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”80 Spe-
cifically, among other more extreme techniques, it bans: forced nudity 
or sexually suggestive poses; placing tape or a hood over the eyes of a 
detainee; using military dogs in interrogation; and the deprivation of 
food, water, or medical care.81 
 The overall policy of the Manual is further underscored by its pro-
posed method of evaluation for interrogators that question whether a 
particular technique crosses the line into a banned procedure.82 It in-
structs soldiers to ask, “if the . . . technique were used by the enemy 
against one of your fellow soldiers, would you believe the soldier had 
been abused?”83 Consequently, the Army Field Manual not only prohib-
its certain techniques in accordance with international law, but it also 
drives home the broader notion that enemies should only be subjected 
to tactics which soldiers would be comfortable having their comrades 
experience.84 
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77 See id. at 61. 
78 John Hendren, Manual Defines Limits of Prisoner Interrogation, Nat’l Pub. Radio, 
(Sep. 6, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5776992. 
79 See Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 2–22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Opera-
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80 Id. at 5–74. 
81 Id. at 5–75. 
82 See id. at 5–76. 
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c. Convention Against Torture and Detainee Treatment Act Limitations 
 In addition to Common Article III and the Army Field Manual, the 
CAT and the DTA were also identified by President Obama in Executive 
Order 13491 as establishing the lawful parameters of detainee interroga-
tion.85 While the CAT is an international agreement and the DTA is 
domestic law, both documents ban torture as well as any “cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment.”86 What is more, in both 
the CAT and DTA, the United States interprets “cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment” according to the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.87 That is, the inter-
rogation or punishment that would contravene those constitutional 
limitations would also violate the government’s international obligations 
under the CAT and its domestic law obligations under the DTA.88 In this 
way, two of the laws which President Obama highlights as constraints on 
interrogation methods are coextensive with the legal protections of the 
U.S. Constitution on interrogation.89 
2. Limitations on Interrogation for a Civilian Criminal 
 Just as the decision by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona 
expanded the opportunity of a criminal defendant to access counsel, 
the case similarly impacted a defendant’s protections against law en-
forcement interrogation.90 Once in custody, under Miranda and its 
progeny, a criminal defendant invoking his right to remain silent cuts 
off all questioning unless he freely chooses to subsequently waive that 
right and speak with authorities.91 
 In addition to the accused’s right to end questioning as articulated 
in Miranda, the Due Process Clause also limits the conduct of law en-
forcement officials during the interrogation process.92 Due process 
demands that any confession be voluntary, while taking into account 
                                                                                                                      
85 Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 ( Jan. 22, 2009). 
86 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a) (2006); Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 16, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty 
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87 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd(a), 2000dd(d); William A. Schabas, The Abolition of 
the Death Penalty in International Law 403 (3d ed. 2002). 
88 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd(a), 2000dd(d); Schabas, supra note 87, at 403. 
89 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd(a), 2000dd(d); Schabas, supra note 87, at 403. 
90 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
91 See Robert M. Bloom & Mark S. Brodin, Criminal Procedure: The Constitu-
tion and the Police 282 (5th ed. 2006). 
92 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1936). 
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characteristics of the suspect as well as the degree of misconduct and 
coercion by law enforcement.93 The case law holds that physical force 
during an interrogation makes any confessions or evidence obtained 
from those tactics involuntary and thus inadmissible at trial.94 Similarly, 
threats of physical violence also are considered involuntary and violate 
the Due Process Clause.95 
 In establishing the contours of due process outside of the categori-
cal prohibitions against violence and threats of violence, an inquiry 
into what is permissible by law enforcement is very fact sensitive.96 For 
instance, the Supreme Court of Minnesota ruled that police threaten-
ing to charge a defendant with more crimes if he lied is involuntary, 
but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a confession when law 
enforcement referenced the electric chair as punishment and blatantly 
misrepresented evidence.97 As another example, where police threat-
ened to cut off state aid to a suspect’s children if she did not confess, 
the Supreme Court found such actions “impellingly coercive” and thus 
involuntary,98 but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that police 
bursting into a suspect’s room at 6:30 in the morning, holding him na-
ked, and asserting that he would go to jail for life if he did not cooper-
ate did not render his subsequent confession involuntary.99 
 In another line of cases and constitutional restraints, the Supreme 
Court held that the substantive due process rights conferred by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bars executive abuse of power that 
“shocks the conscience.”100 This inquiry is also fact sensitive as 
“[d]eliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not be 
so patently egregious in another.”101 As a constitutional matter, consid-
ering this standard as well as the aforementioned voluntariness re-
quirement, courts have found the following conduct violates the Con-
stitution: hand-cuffing a detainee to a post while standing up for a 
substantial period of time and beyond the time needed to ensure or-
der; keeping the temperature at unreasonable levels in detention facili-
ties; and questioning that lasts an entire day over the course of multiple 
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days.102 In contrast, courts have not struck down practices such as ex-
tended solitary confinement or constant lighting during detention so 
long as authorities are doing so in order to promote order or safety.103 
III. Analysis 
 The provisions for access to counsel and the legal limitations on 
interrogations for detainees tried before military commissions are sub-
stantially similar to those involving an Article III criminal suspect.104 The 
principal ground for any differentiation is that, unlike Article III sus-
pects, military commission detainees are not entitled to Miranda warn-
ings.105 Nevertheless, any adverse impact on national security caused by 
administering or not administering Miranda warnings is tenably refuted 
by scholarship which concludes that Miranda does not negatively affect 
law enforcement efforts in any empirically demonstrable way.106 More-
over, as a matter of anecdotal evidence, the case of Abdulmutallab does 
not undermine this argument.107 
A. Right to Counsel Comparison 
 In certain respects, the right to counsel under military commissions 
is commensurate with the right to counsel enjoyed by criminal defen-
                                                                                                                      
102 See Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954); Michael John Garcia, Interroga-
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107 See Pincus, supra note 9 (noting that Abdulmutallab stopped speaking with authori-
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dants.108 The 2009 MCA states the accused “shall be represented . . . be-
fore a military commission,” and the Constitution similarly requires that 
the right of the accused to counsel attaches at the commencement of 
adversarial judicial proceedings.109 What is more, there is no evidence to 
suggest the caliber and zeal of counsel representing an unprivileged bel-
ligerent—whether it is JAG or a team consisting of civilian attorneys and 
JAG—would necessarily be less than that of an attorney representing an 
Article III criminal.110 Despite some past problems with attorney access 
at Guantánamo, a recent Department of Defense report concludes the 
attorneys of the most recent detainees who were charged under the 
MCA have “access to their detainee clients and the means to seek re-
dress in the event they believe their access is unreasonably curtailed.”111 
In the interests of not being too sanguine, it should be underscored that 
there are a range of challenges still faced by attorneys representing mili-
tary commission detainees,112 but as a comparative matter, many de-
fense lawyers in Article III courts also operate in an imperfect criminal 
justice system with glaring inequities and difficulties.113 
                                                                                                                     
 Despite the aforementioned similarities, a critical difference be-
tween military commissions and Article III courts is that no constitu-
tional or legal authority asserts that unprivileged belligerents are enti-
tled to the warnings and protections of Miranda.114 At the beginning of 
any custodial interrogation, Miranda requires, among other things, that 
a suspect be explicitly informed of his right to counsel and that ques-
tioning cannot proceed in the absence of an attorney without an af-
firmative waiver of the right.115 Thus, although unprivileged belligerents 
possess the right to an attorney for the military commission proceedings 
once they are charged, there is no legal obligation that they be offered 
 
108 See 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. 
109 See 10 U.S.C. § 949c(b); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. 
110 Luban, supra note 51, at 2000 (suggesting that JAGs may even be more effective 
rule of law defenders than civilian attorneys). 
111 Detainee Report, supra note 55, at 67. 
112 See Matthew Ivey, Challenges Presented to Military Lawyers Representing Detainees in the 
War on Terrorism, 66 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 211 passim (2010) (surveying the many chal-
lenges faced by military lawyers representing military commission detainees). 
113 See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National 
Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031 passim (2006) (highlighting the myriad difficulties for indi-
gent defendants in the criminal justice system). 
114 Compare 10 U.S.C. §§ 948, 949 (containing no reference to Miranda rights or any 
analogous protections in military commissions), and Sievert, supra note 105, at 92 (assert-
ing that detainees do not enjoy Miranda rights in military commissions), with Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444 (holding that criminal defendants are entitled to Miranda warnings). 
115 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
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access to an attorney before that point.116 Moreover, a very important 
legal question remains in situations where an unprivileged belligerent 
requests counsel at the beginning of custodial interrogation. This pre-
cise question has not yet been resolved by the courts.117 
 Another important difference between military commissions and 
Article III proceedings is that, once formal charges are filed in an Arti-
cle III court, the attorney becomes the intermediary between the state 
and the accused, and the Sixth Amendment bars the government from 
eliciting statements outside the presence of counsel.118 No such consti-
tutional right exists with military commissions, and the 2009 MCA does 
not prohibit custodial interrogation of the suspect once the military 
commission commences.119 
B. Comparison of Limitations on Interrogation Techniques 
 Myriad sources of law are now interpreted to apply to terrorists 
held as unprivileged belligerents.120 In fact, the standards of treatment 
in some of those sources explicitly peg the protections of detainees to 
what is permitted by the U.S. Constitution under the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments.121 Both the DTA and CAT use the Constitu-
tion to mark the outward bounds of permissible techniques.122 
 Still, the fact that the Constitution is invoked as a marker of sensi-
ble treatment of unprivileged belligerents does not mean that the per-
missible interrogation techniques of an alleged purse-snatcher will be 
the same as that for a terrorist suspect.123 Justice Jackson famously re-
marked that the Constitution is not a “suicide pact,”124 and Supreme 
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Court jurisprudence quite reasonably holds that due process is not sub-
ject to a “mechanical application” and law enforcement conduct that 
“shocks in one environment may not be so patently egregious in an-
other.”125 To this end, commentators note that permissible techniques 
for those accused of more pedestrian crimes may be different than 
those permitted for use on suspected terrorists;126 however, this would 
be the case irrespective of whether the accused is held as an unprivi-
leged belligerent or an Article III criminal.127 
 The notion that the protection for alleged terrorists during inter-
rogation is equivalent to the constitutional safeguards for accused 
criminals in the Article III context is further bolstered by recent inter-
pretations of Common Article III in the Geneva Conventions.128 In a 
2009 executive order, President Obama identified Common Article III 
as a “minimum baseline” for treatment of all detainees under authority 
of the United States.129 Common Article III explicitly bans physical vio-
lence, and the Department of Defense interprets the provision to also 
ban threats of physical violence.130 Similarly, the constitutional require-
ment of due process also prohibits violence and threats of violence in 
the interrogation process.131 
 Conversely, while international and domestic legal limitations on 
the interrogation of detainees are equivalent to the protection of Arti-
cle III criminal suspects under the Constitution, unprivileged belliger-
ents do not enjoy the prophylactic constitutional protection of 
Miranda.132 Just like the safeguards of the right to counsel, law en-
forcement is not required to advise belligerents of their right to remain 
silent as they would with an Article III criminal suspect.133 Of course, 
the significance of this difference is somewhat mitigated by the current 
practice at Guantánamo Bay, which makes all of its interrogations vol-
untary and reports that one-third of its interrogations are initiated by 
detainees.134 
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C. Are the Republican Criticisms Merited? 
 Republicans are right to assert that the accused in an Article III 
criminal court enjoys different rights with respect to counsel and inter-
rogation as compared to a detainee prosecuted in a military commis-
sion.135 Although unprivileged belligerents and criminal suspects are 
entitled to the same protection under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as it relates to physical and mental 
abuse, belligerents do not enjoy the prophylactic constitutional protec-
tion of Miranda.136 Additionally, although there is a right to counsel in 
military commissions as well as Article III criminal courts,137 there is no 
constitutional mandate requiring belligerents to be advised of this right 
and no Sixth Amendment obligation that limits authorities from speak-
ing with the belligerent unless his lawyer is present, once adjudicatory 
proceedings commence.138 Importantly, then, the question becomes 
whether these differences actually undermine intelligence gathering 
and national security. And, more specifically, whether the treatment of 
Abdulmutallab as an Article III criminal defendant was sensible in 
terms of national security, as the Obama Administrations insists, or if 
this argument is “ridiculous” and the “whole process of criminalizing 
the war is misguided,” as one leading Republican asserted.139 
1. Practical Effects of the Differences in Procedural Rights 
 Undermining the Republican argument and perhaps contrary to 
popular perceptions, it is likely that the issuing of Miranda warnings to 
terrorist suspects does not make a significant difference as far as intelli-
gence gathering goes.140 Among law enforcement officials, the “perva-
sively shared” view is that “Miranda safeguards do not pose any serious 
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impediment to effective law enforcement.”141 Generally, academics con-
cur with this assessment.142 In attempting to quantify the effects of 
Miranda, one important study maintained that even accepting an oppo-
nent’s questionable methodology, the adverse impacts of Miranda could 
only be estimated to have lost convictions 0.78% of the time.143 More-
over, the study concludes that, “[f]or practical purposes, Miranda’s em-
pirically demonstrable harm to law enforcement is essentially nil.”144 
 A likely rebuttal to this argument is that the metric behind the 
Miranda data focuses on convictions, whereas the argument of Republi-
cans is not that the United States will experience a decline in convic-
tions, but that issuing Miranda rights decreases the likelihood of obtain-
ing important intelligence.145 This line of argument is suspect, however, 
because the explanation for why so little convictions are lost is that the 
same information can be obtained using alternative interrogation tech-
niques while nonetheless employing the prophylactic procedure of 
Miranda.146 That is, experience shows that Miranda warnings do not 
protect against investigators finding the truth, but rather, the warnings 
protect criminals from investigators’ use of coercive methods of getting 
to the truth.147 If one accepts this notion, then it becomes difficult to 
make the argument that Miranda is somehow unduly restrictive of intel-
ligence gathering and should never be issued to a terrorist suspect who 
could possibly possess national security information.148 Indeed, scholars 
and law enforcement generally believe that Miranda’s adverse impact 
on law enforcement is minimal.149 
 Even if one does not accept this argument, two more related but 
distinct points still undercut the assertion that putting alleged terrorists 
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in Article III criminal courts, and thus following Miranda and its prog-
eny, impedes intelligence gathering.150 First, only one out of every five 
criminal defendants will actually exercise their Miranda rights.151 More-
over, those with felony records are four times as likely to invoke their 
rights as those without because of their past experience with the crimi-
nal justice system.152 Thus, even if one believed Miranda significantly 
impacted an interrogator’s ability to collect national security informa-
tion, presumably most terrorist suspects would not have previous ex-
perience with the U.S. criminal justice system, and thus would be less 
likely to invoke their Miranda rights.153 
 Second, and more importantly, Miranda jurisprudence factors in 
exigencies such as critical national security matters, and makes excep-
tions in instances where the “need for answers to questions in a situa-
tion posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need for the prophy-
lactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination.”154 Therefore, even if one accepts the argument that 
Miranda warnings restrict intelligence gathering, the public safety ex-
ception of Miranda mitigates the potential effect of this point because it 
allows law enforcement to not issue the warnings when there is an im-
mediate need for answers.155 The fact that Miranda entails a balancing 
test which weighs the potential threat suggests that courts and law en-
forcement would apply the exception even more broadly in the context 
of terrorist interrogations.156 Attorney General Eric Holder has ac-
knowledged the value of this exception to Miranda for law enforcement 
in the case of terrorist plots, and he recently asked Congress for more 
clarity and guidance in applying the decades-old doctrine in the mod-
ern age.157 
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 Moving beyond Miranda, another difference between the interro-
gations and right to counsel of an unprivileged belligerent in a military 
commission versus the accused in an Article III criminal court is that a 
belligerent possesses no Sixth Amendment right barring questioning 
outside the presence of counsel once judicial proceedings com-
mence.158 If an alleged terrorist were tried in an Article III court, the 
required presence of an attorney during interrogations could render 
interrogations less effective, or simply create a logistical impediment.159 
Thus, it is certainly plausible that this difference could hamper intelli-
gence gathering, as the Sixth Amendment attaches as early as the 
prosecutor filing an indictment or arraigning the accused.160 
 Nevertheless, the Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present 
during interrogations may be waived by a defendant at any time during 
the judicial proceedings.161 Moreover, once the military commission 
commences, although there is no right to have counsel present during 
interrogations, the unprivileged belligerent still has access to at least one 
attorney.162 Thus, whatever supposed interference results from an at-
torney’s presence during interrogations in an Article III proceeding 
could nonetheless occur during pre-interrogation detainee-counsel 
meetings; the belligerent can even condition his speaking with authori-
ties on his attorney being present.163 In this way, although there is a dif-
ference between Article III courts and military commissions in terms of 
legal rights, these differences become much less apparent when one 
examines their practical effects.164 
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2. Application to Abdulmutallab 
 Applying the aforementioned analysis to the case of Abdulmutal-
lab underscores why it is quite plausible that treating the Christmas Day 
Bomber as an Article III criminal suspect did not make a significant 
difference in terms of national security intelligence.165 Abdulmutallab 
would have received a lawyer regardless of whether he was charged as 
an Article III criminal or an unprivileged belligerent.166 In addition, 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments would have limited the interro-
gation practices of authorities irrespective of his status.167 
                                                                                                                     
 Of course, if Abdulmutallab were held as an unprivileged belliger-
ent, he would not have been read Miranda warnings, and early reports 
indicate that Abdulmutallab stopped talking to authorities after receiv-
ing Miranda warnings.168 Later reports, however, asserted that authori-
ties did not issue Miranda warnings until after he refused to speak,169 
and that he was legally questioned by authorities under Miranda’s pub-
lic safety exception in the time before the warnings were issued.170 In-
deed, the event which seemed to trigger his reluctance to speak was not 
the Miranda warnings, but the fact that he spent about four hours in 
surgery improving what was a “deteriorating” condition over the course 
of the initial interrogations.171 
 Whatever the exact course of events, it is undisputed that Abdul-
mutallab resumed answering questions about a month later, in January 
2010.172 The Federal Bureau of Investigation enlisted the help of his 
family, and reports indicate that Abdulmutallab subsequently cooper-
ated for a number of days and provided significant intelligence to au-
thorities.173 
 Thus, the case of Abdulmutallab illustrates precisely why treating 
him as a criminal defendant did not significantly undermine intelli-
gence gathering efforts.174 The Miranda warnings issued to him do not 
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appear to have altered his decision to stop talking to authorities, and 
even if they had, shrewd and resourceful interrogation tactics managed 
to get him to speak again.175 Moreover, the apparent success with cajol-
ing him to speak a second time suggests that the attached right to 
counsel was not a major impediment to interrogation efforts.176 
 Abdulmutallab’s case is not an aberration.177 There are many cases 
in recent history where law enforcement treated suspected terrorists 
with the same procedures as Article III criminal defendants and got 
similar results.178 Richard Reid, the infamous shoe bomber, received 
Miranda warnings multiple times over a two-day period without exercis-
ing his rights or discontinuing cooperation as a result.179 Similarly, al-
leged terrorists L’Houssaine Kherchtou and Nuradin Abdi both pro-
vided important counter-terrorism intelligence after receiving Miranda 
warnings.180 In this way, practical experience does not suggest that put-
ting a terrorist suspect in an Article III court necessarily undermines 
intelligence collection.181 
D. Are Military Commissions Useless? 
 In spite of the similarities highlighted in the previous discussion 
between the rights of detainees in military commissions to those of an 
Article III criminal suspect, military commissions are not useless.182 In-
deed, there are other concerns which support the use of military com-
missions.183 For one, military commissions are “portable” and can be 
held on any U.S. military base throughout the world; thus, municipal 
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and state governments would not shoulder the considerable expense of 
providing security for a terrorist trial.184 In addition, military commis-
sions are typically considered more efficient and may deliver verdicts 
more quickly.185 
 Another very significant difference between Article III courts and 
military commissions is that the latter offer the possibility of more 
flexibility with evidentiary rules.186 For instance, at a time of military 
conflict, it may be too onerous for the government to adhere to the 
strict rules of hearsay, and evidentiary requirements may be adjusted to 
reflect this reality.187 
 Finally, there is some force to the argument that international ter-
rorists are committing acts of war, and thus ought not to be treated as 
domestic criminals simply as a matter of principle.188 
 Yet, while these concerns (and more) are certainly legitimate and 
may lead one to conclude that military commissions are the most ap-
propriate forum for international terrorists, it goes too far to say that 
treating the Christmas Day Bomber and other terrorist suspects as Arti-
cle III criminal suspects inevitably puts the United States at risk.189 The 
legal protections provided to suspects in Article III courts in terms of 
access to counsel and interrogation limits are largely the same as in 
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military commissions, and it is quite plausible that the type of tribunal 
used to handle these types of criminals does not make a difference in 
terms of national security.190 
Conclusion 
 The issue of terrorism and how the United States treats captured 
terrorist suspects evokes significant criticism and debate from academic, 
legal, and political circles as well as everyday citizens. There is no doubt 
that people passionately disagree on many of the central issues includ-
ing what to do with terrorists such as Abdulmutallab. Those who argue 
that terrorists should be treated as unprivileged enemy belligerents and 
thus tried before military commissions rightfully deserve a place at the 
table to advance their ideas; however, there is no place for debating 
without facts, and mischaracterizing the obligations of the United States 
under domestic and international law. There are some differences be-
tween the way Abdulmutallab and terrorists like him would be treated in 
Article III criminal court as compared to military commissions, but it is 
far from certain that such differences would adversely impact intelli-
gence gathering efforts. While there are other good reasons to support 
military commissions, politicians, administration officials, and citizens 
who passionately care about this issue must not lose sight of this point. 
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